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Section 2254(d) of the Federal Habeas Statute:
Is It Beyond Reason?
EVAN TSEN LEE*

INTRODUCTION

The world of federal habeas corpus continues to be dominated by
issues arising from Congress's passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"I).' One of AEDPA's most notable
innovations was § 2254(d), which effectively requires federal habeas
courts to accord state court criminal convictions a sort of deference The
problem is that § 2254(d) is unusually ambiguous with respect to how3
much and what sort of deference is owed, and under what circumstances.
Pre-AEDPA Supreme Court decisions are of little or no help because
the federal habeas statute never before contained anything like
§ 2254(d).4 The Supreme Court has started to resolve issues about how to

* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; A.B., University of
California, Berkeley; J.D., Yale Law School. I would like to thank Vik Amar and Larry Yackle for
reading drafts and making helpful suggestions. I would also like to thank Academic Dean Leo
Martinez for his unflagging support, financial and otherwise, for this and other scholarly endeavors
over the years.
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2256 (2000).
2. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text. Section 22 5 4(d) states:
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to
the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was
adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim(i) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;
or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
3. Note that § 2254(d) uses none of the terms traditionally employed in standard-of-review
jurisprudence, such as "clearly erroneous," "de novo," "supported by substantial evidence," or "clear
and convincing evidence."
4. Prior to the AEDPA, the Supreme Court had established a set of standards of review for
federal habeas. Pure questions of law and so-called "mixed questions of law and fact" were to be
reviewed on a de novo basis. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 507 (1953); see also Miller v. Fenton, 474
U.S. 104, t14 (1985) (holding that where the "relevant legal principle can be given meaning only
through its application to the particular circumstances of a case, the Court has been reluctant to give
the trier of fact's conclusions presumptive force"). State court findings of fact were to be accepted
unless unsupported by substantial evidence. Brown, 344 U.S. at 506.
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interpret § 2254(d), 5 but the wide variety of procedural permutations
presented by federal habeas corpus review guarantees that important
and difficult issues will continue to arise for years to come.7
One of the most pressing issues is how federal habeas courts should
review "silent" state court decisions-that is, summary affirmances or
summary denials of relief, or opinions that dispose of whole claims in a8
perfunctory manner (e.g., "Petitioner's other claims are without merit").
The circuits are presently split on this question, and the Supreme Court
has not formally undertaken to resolve the conflict.9 When the Supreme
Court does take the issue head on, it will probably have to decide
whether the reasonableness review required by the AEDPA refers to
reasonableness of the state court's analysis or reasonableness of the state
court's result." Technical as it may sound, this is a politically loaded
question. If federal habeas courts are required to review the analysis of
state court decisions for their reasonableness, then state court decisions
that are silent as to their analysis cannot be reviewed on a deferential
basis. Either such decisions would have to be reviewed de novo, or they
would have to be "sent back" for the state court to articulate its
analysis."
Those who feel aggrieved by the (perceived) frequency with which
federal courts grant habeas relief will be antagonistic toward the
possibility of de novo review, while those who believe state courts are
already overburdened will strongly oppose any requirement that state
appellate courts articulate their analysis in every criminal case. It is
therefore not difficult to predict how the Supreme Court will eventually
resolve the conflict. Indeed, as I will explain in the next section, the
Court has (perhaps inadvertently) already foreshadowed the adoption of
an approach whereby federal habeas courts review only the results, and
not the analysis, of state court adjudications for reasonableness.
5. The first case in which the Court really took § 2254(d)(i) head on was Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362, 409-1o (2ooo) (holding that "unreasonable application" means something more than merely
"incorrect" and that reasonableness is to be measured by an objective standard).
6. The great variety in procedural permutations mostly stems from the variety in appellate
practices and opinion-writing habits of 50 state judiciaries.
7. Many of these future problems are canvassed in Evan Tsen Lee, Section 2254(d) of the New
Habeas Statute: An (Opinionated) User's Manual, 51 VAND. L. REV. 103 (1998), and in Larry W.
Yackle, A Primeron the New Habeas CorpusStatute, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 381 (1996).
8. See infra notes 13-16.

9. See infra Part I.A.
io. The Court could obviate the need to resolve this question if it decides that silent state court
judgments are not "adjudicated on the merits" within the meaning of § 2254(d). In fact, the circuits are
split on this question too. See infra notes 13-16. But it seems likely that the Supreme Court will hold
that such judgments are "on the merits" so long as they have full preclusive effect, and I will assume
that for purposes of this Article.
is. "Sent back" only in a manner of speaking. Federal habeas courts review the legality of
custody simpliciter, and not the state court judgment per se, Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 430 (1963), so

technically speaking remand is impossible. The proper course in that situation is for the federal district
court to grant relief with the proviso that relief will be stayed if the state court grants a new hearing.
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In this Article I will argue that the Supreme Court should render this
prediction incorrect. I will argue that "reasonableness of the result"
review would be inconsistent with the intellectual history of federal
habeas corpus reform efforts over the last forty years. Furthermore,
review of results alone would be in tension with the text of the statute
and would accord only a false sense of respect for state courts. However
much political and practical sense a "reasonableness of the result"
approach might seem to make, a "reasonableness of the analysis"
standard represents a more faithful interpretation of the text, history,
and structure of § 2254(d).
In Section I, I survey the circuit split with respect to silent state court
judgments, as well as the Supreme Court decision that foreshadows
adoption of the "reasonableness of results" approach. In Section II, I
argue that "reasonableness of results" review would create a serious
tension with the text of § 2254(d). In Sections III through V, I explain
why the legislative, intellectual, and political history of federal habeas
reform, as well as policy considerations, favor reasonableness review of
state court analysis.
I.
A.

EXISTING DOCTRINE

THE CIRCUIT CONFLICT

The precise issue that divides the circuits is whether the
"unreasonable application" clause of § 2254(d)(I) applies to state court
judgments unaccompanied by opinion.
The category of "state court judgments unaccompanied by opinion"
includes cases where the last state court summarily affirmed the
conviction, summarily denied habeas relief ("postcard denials"), or wrote
opinions that disposed of entire claims without explanation ("petitioner's
other claims are without merit"). I shall refer to these as "silent
judgments." Another category of cases, treated differently by some
circuits, contains those state court opinions that refer to state law onlythey do not discuss the federal constitutional dimensions of the relevant
issues. I will refer to these as "partial opinions."' 2 The First and Third
Circuits treat silent judgments as not constituting "adjudications on the
merits" within the meaning of § 2254(d), and therefore reviewable on a
de novo basis." The Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have
held that silent judgments count as "adjudications on the merits," and
furthermore, that federal habeas courts are to review such judgments for

12. My proposal would treat partial opinions the same as silent judgments.
13. See Gruning v. DiPaolo, 311 F.3d 69, 71 (ist Cir. 2002); Appel v. Hom, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d
Cir. 2001); DiBenedetto v.. Hall, 272 F.3d 1, 6-7 (Ist Cir. 200t); Hameen v. Delaware, 212 F.3d 226,
247-48 (3d Cir. 2ooo).
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the reasonableness of their results.' One circuit, the Ninth, appears to
have held that silent judgments are adjudications on the merits, but that
de novo review applies nonetheless. 5 Still another circuit, the Tenth,
seems to be divided within itself on the matter of whether a silent
judgment constitutes an adjudication on the merits. 6 Meanwhile, the
Second and Third Circuits have held that a partial opinion is not an
"adjudication on the merits" and is therefore reviewable on a de novo
basis. 7
B.

YARBOROUGH V. ALVARADO

The Supreme Court has not directly tackled the question of what
review to accord silent state court judgments. However, last Term in
Yarborough v. Alvarado8 the Court may have foreshadowed its future
approach in dealing with silent state court judgments. The issue was
whether petitioner Alvarado was "in custody" within the meaning of
Miranda v. Arizona'9 at the time he made certain incriminating
statements. 20 The Court noted that the test for determining custody
evolved through a series of decisions culminating in Thompson v.
Keohane2 The Court's opinion in Thompson described a two-factor test
for "custody": "[F]irst, what were the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable
person have felt he or 'she was not at liberty to terminate the
interrogation and leave."22 If the Supreme Court had regarded
14. See Jenkins v. Artuz, 294 F.3 d 284, 292 (2d Cir. 2002); Wright v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corrs.,
278 F.3d 1245, 1254-56 (lith Cir. 2002); Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 175 (4th Cir. 200o); Hennon v.
Cooper, 1O9 F.3d 330, 334-35 (7th Cir. 1997).
15. See Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d lo81, lO88-89 (9th Cir. 2002). A more recent case holds that
a silent judgment, as an adjudication on the merits, is subject to independent review for "clear error."
Luna v. Cambra, 3o6 F.3 d 954, 959 ( 9 th Cir. 2002). But, the "clear error" standard was specifically
disapproved in the Supreme Court's opinion in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003). The Ninth
Circuit's most recent pronouncement reacts to Andrade by saying that a federal habeas court conducts
an independent review of the facts-but not the application of law to facts-for the limited purpose of
determining whether the state court's application was "objectively unreasonable." See Himes v.
Thompson, 336 F. 3 d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003).
16. Compare Duckett v. Mullin, 3o6 F.3d 982, 991 n.I (loth Cir. 2002) (holding that silent
judgments are not adjudicated on the merits) and Neill v. Gibson, 278 F.3d 1044, 1050-53 (Ioth Cir.
2ooI) with Aycox v. Little, 196 F.3d 1174, 1177 (ioth Cir. i999) (holding that silent judgments are
adjudicated on the merits and reviewable for reasonableness of result).
17. See Rompilla v. Horn, 355 F- 3 d 233, 247 (3d Cir. 2004); Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3 d 303, 31014 (2d Cir. 2001). The Fifth Circuit analyzes a silent or partial state court opinion to decide whether it
is "substantive" or "procedural," and if it is "substantive," it is an adjudication on the merits. See Neal
v. Puckett, 239 F.3 d 683, 686-87, 696 (5th Cir. 2OOl); Mercadel v. Cain, 179 F.3d 271, 274-75 (5th Cir.
'999).
18. 124 S. Ct. 2140 (2004).
19. 384 U.S. 436,476-77 (1966).
20. Yarborough, 124 S. Ct. at 2147. The California Court of Appeal addressed Alvarado's
Miranda claim in the unpublished portion of an opinion going under the name of his co-defendant. See
People v. Soto, 1999 Daily J. D.A.R. 9571, 9573-75.
21. 516 U.S. 99 (1995).
22. Id. at 112.
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application ... of clearly established Federal law" to

mean "unreasonable" as judged by the state court's analysis, the Court
would have reviewed the state court opinion and ascertained precisely
the manner in which the state court applied the two-factor Thompson
test. However, Justice Kennedy's opinion for a 5-4 majority did not
inquire into the state court's reasoning but instead constructed a sliding
scale based on the specificity or generality of the governing legal test.
This scale, in turn, would determine how "far off the mark" a state
court's ruling may be and still qualify as "not unreasonable" for purposes
of § 2254(d)(I). The Court began by conducting its own de novo review
of the custody issue: "Ignoring the deferential standard of § 2254(d)(I)
for the moment, it can be said that fair-minded jurists could disagree over
whether Alvarado was in custody."23 In view of the closeness of this
question, the state court's determination that Alvarado was not in
custody could not be deemed "unreasonable" (as the Ninth Circuit had
found). Justice Kennedy explained:
The term 'unreasonable' is a 'common term in the legal world and,
accordingly, federal judges are familiar with its meaning.' At the same
time, the range of reasonable judgment can depend in part on the
nature of the relevant rule. If a legal rule is specific, the range may be
narrow. Applications of the rule may be plainly correct or incorrect.
Other rules are more general, and their meaning must emerge in
application over the course of time. Applying a general standard to a
specific case can demand a substantial element of judgment. As a
result, evaluating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires
considering the rule's specificity. The more general the rule, the more
leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case
determinations.'

After reviewing the facts surrounding the interrogation in detail,
Justice Kennedy stated:
These differing indications lead us to hold that the state court's

application of our custody standard was reasonable. The Court of
Appeals was nowhere close to the mark when it concluded otherwise.
Although the question of what [constitutes] an 'unreasonable
application' of law might be difficult in some cases, it is not difficult

here. The custody test is general, and the state court's application of
our law fits within the matrix of our prior decisions. We cannot grant
relief under AEDPA by conducting our own independent inquiry into

whether the state court was correct as a de novo matter. '[A] federal

habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court
concludes in its independent2 judgment that the state-court decision
applied [the law] incorrectly.
1

Let us take stock of the Alvarado majority's approach. First, a court
Yarborough, 124 S. Ct. at 2149.
24. Id. (citation omitted).
25. Id. at 2150 (citation omitted). The first bracketed word in the quoted language (or something
like it) appears to have been inadvertently omitted from the opinion.
23.
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conducting an "unreasonable application" review under § 2254(d)(I)
must determine whether the legal standard clearly established by
Supreme Court precedent is "specific," "general," or somewhere in
between. 6 This sliding scale determines how far off the mark a state
court decision must be in order to qualify as "unreasonable." The more
general the governing standard, the more leeway state courts must be given.
Next, the court conducts a de novo review of the salient issue." The court
then compares the state court's conclusion to its own de novo conclusion.
If the state court's decision was correct, it is per se not unreasonable. If it
is incorrect, the federal habeas court must then measure how far off the
mark it was. If the governing legal standard is "general," then the state
court's decision must be very far off the mark to be "unreasonable. '"S If
the governing legal standard is "specific," then the state court's decision
need only be modestly off the mark to be "unreasonable." But that is not
all; there is an important proviso to the second step. If the federal habeas
court's de novo review reveals that the question is sufficiently close that
"fair-minded jurists could disagree,"" then the state court decision is per
se not unreasonable. Under those circumstances, it is impossible for the
state court's decision to be sufficiently off the mark to be denominated
"unreasonable," presumably because "the mark" is so large or
amorphous that no result can be very far from it.
This test is logically bizarre at best, and incoherent at worst. The
Alvarado Court, following the Court's opinion in Williams v. Taylor,
denies that "unreasonable application" means "wrong" or "incorrect.""
That the state court decision might be incorrect is not enough to justify
the

grant

of

relief

under

§ 2254(d)(i)-the

decision

must

be

"unreasonable."'" So far, so good. The Court then conducts a de novo
review of the custody question, which must produce one of three
conclusions: "incustody," "not in custody," or "too close to call" (i.e.,
sufficiently close that fair-minded jurists could disagree),3" On these facts,
the Alvarado Court decided the custody question was "too close to call,"
meaning that it was per se not unreasonable.33 Fair enough. Suppose,
however, that the Supreme Court's de novo review had culminated in a
26. Id. at 2149.
27. Id. The Court's statement that, "[w]e cannot grant relief under AEDPA by conducting our
own independent inquiry into whether the state court was correct as a de novo matter," is somewhat
o
misleading. See id. at 215 .The Court in Yarborough does in fact conduct a de novo review. However,
it does not simply use that de novo conclusion to determine whether the state court was correct or
incorrect'. It uses the de novo conclusion as a point against which to measure "how close" or "how far"
the state court's conclusion is.
28. Id.at 2149.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 2150.
3. Id.
32. Id. at 2149.
33. Id.
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finding that Alvarado was in custody. Presumably then the question is
whether the state court's finding of "not in custody" is impermissibly far
off the mark. But what mark? Logically, the "mark" (in my hypothetical)
is the Supreme Court's de novo conclusion that Alvarado was in custody.
So the question, if one takes the Alvarado methodology seriously, comes
down to this: How far off the mark is an answer of "not in custody" when
the correct answer is "in custody"?" This is like asking how far off the
mark an answer of "on" is when the correct answer is "off."
One might protest that I have forgotten about the first step of the
Alvarado methodology, which is to ask whether the governing legal
standard is "specific," "general," or "somewhere in between."" This step,
it might be argued, prevents the inquiry from degenerating into logical
absurdity. But does it? Let us suppose that the "custody" standard of
Miranda, as articulated by Thompson v. Keohane,36 is "general." This
means the state court's determination on the custody question must be
very far off the mark in order to be denominated "unreasonable." Now
the ultimate question, reformulated to take into account the generality of
the governing legal standard, is: "Is an answer of 'not in custody' very far
off the mark when the correct answer is 'in custody?' Clearly, adding
this step to the inquiry has not helped.
One might instead object to my statement that de novo review on a
Miranda custody issue must always culminate in one of three conclusions:
"in custody," "not in custody," or "too close to call." Perhaps the
Alvarado Court does not envision federal habeas courts ever reaching a
conclusion of "in custody" or "not in custody." Perhaps the Alvarado
Court envisions de novo review only for the limited purpose of
determining "too close to call" or "not too close to call" (i.e., sufficiently
clear that fair-minded jurists could not disagree). We know what happens
when the habeas court finds the question too close to call-the state
court's decision is per se not unreasonable. But what happens when the
habeas court finds that the question is not too close to call? How can the
habeas court then go on to determine whether the state court decision is
too far off the mark? The reviewing court has not reached its own de
novo conclusion about custody. In other words, under this methodology,
there is no mark. One cannot ask a reviewing court to measure how far
off the mark a previous decision was unless the reviewing court is
permitted to identify a mark.
The Court cannot have its cake and eat it too. If the Court wants
"unreasonable application" to pivot at least in part on results, then it
must accept as a logical necessity that there will be at least some cases in
34. Indeed, one must wonder whether the Alvarado majority settled on "too close to call"
precisely to avoid having to confront this logical trap.
35. Id. at 2149.
36. 516 U.S. 99, 112 (995).
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which "unreasonableness" equates to nothing more than "incorrectness."
The Court cannot escape this hard logical truth by simply protesting that
"unreasonableness" is different from "incorrectness." If the Court wants
"unreasonableness" to be different from "incorrectness" in all cases, then
it must move completely away from results as criteria for
"unreasonableness" and toward something else, presumably the state
court's reasoning."
To this point I have tried to show why the "reasonableness of
results" approach suggested by Alvarado is logically flawed. In the
remainder of the article, I will make an affirmative argument for a
"reasonableness of analysis" approach. The argument covers the text of
§ 2254(d), its legislative history, and finally its intellectual and political
history.
II. TEXT
Congress added what is now § 2254(d) to the federal habeas corpus
statute as part of the sweeping Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). s It states:
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State
court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim (i) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.39
Prior to Williams v. Taylor, the lower federal courts and academics
pondered the phrase, "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of ...Federal law."' Some argued that this provision
37. Two other opinions from last Term behave as if "unreasonable application" means
"unreasonable result." See Mitchell v. Esparza, 124 S.Ct. 7, 12 (2004) (per curiam); Yarborough v.
Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003) (per curiam). In these brief opinions, the Court does not review the state
courts' reasoning, but rather makes its own in-depth inquiry into the facts relative to the governing
legal standard. In both cases, the Court reversed a Court of Appeals finding that the state court's
decision was not an "unreasonable application" of Supreme Court precedent. The last sentence of a
decision from the previous term, Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 1I (2oo2), also assumes that
reasonableness of the result is what matters: "Even if we agreed with the Ninth Circuit majority...
that there was jury coercion here, it is at least reasonable to conclude that there was not, which means
that the state court's determination to that effect must stand." On the other hand, Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 389 (2ooo), reviews the reasonableness of the state court's analysis, as do Woodford v.
Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 27 (2002) and Price v. Vincent,538 U.S. 634,643 (2003).
38. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 104, i1o Stat.
1218, 1219 (1996).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
40. See infra notes 8o-87 and accompanying text.
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confirmed the federal courts' authority to issue habeas relief in any case
where the state court's decision violated federal law.' On this
interpretation, the phrase "contrary to" was controlling. It authorized
relief in any case where, in the independent judgment of the federal
court, the state court decision was incorrect under federal law. The
phrase "unreasonable application of" was purely illustrative-it merely
gave one example of how a state court decision might run afoul of federal
law. Others argued that the phrases "contrary to" and "unreasonable
application of" operated independently of one another.42 According to
this theory, the phrase "contrary to" denoted pure questions of law,
whereas "unreasonable application of" denoted mixed questions of law
and fact (applications of law to fact).43 If a state court erred on a pure
question of law, the federal court could grant habeas relief. If the state
court erred during the process of applying the correct rule of law to the
facts, the federal court could grant relief only if the application was
"unreasonable" as well as erroneous.' In Williams v. Taylor, Justice
Stevens adopted the first interpretation but could not attract a fifth
vote.45 Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court adopted the second
interpretation. '6 Thus, when examining the phrase "unreasonable
application of," we must consider. its operation independently of the
phrase "contrary to."
The question that immediately concerns us is whether "unreasonable
application" refers to the result of state court adjudication or to the
analytical process of state court adjudication. One problem with the
"result" interpretation is its inability to account for the word "involved."
The statute states that a federal court may grant relief if the state court's
adjudication "resulted in a decision that... involved an unreasonable
application of" federal law.47 The "decision" must "involve" an
application of law to fact. The use of the term "involves" implies that a
decision contains more than simply an application of law to fact. If
Congress had meant for the term "decision" to mean "result," and if it
had meant for "unreasonable" to modify "decision," it could easily have
written, "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or constituted an
unreasonable application of" federal law. Alternatively, it could have
said "represented an unreasonable application of" federal law.
"Constituted" and "represented" are words of equivalence, whereas
"involved" is a word that denotes a greater including a lesser. To put it in
mathematical terms, this statute does not say "decision = application,"
41. See, e.g., Yackle, supra note 7, at 398-441.
42. See, e.g., Lee, supranote 7, at Iio-tI.

43. Id. at iio.
44. Id. at iio-ii.
45. 529 U.S. at 362,384-9o (200o).
46. Id. at 4o4-o9.
47. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(I).
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but rather "decision > application." To interpret "decision" and
"application" as synonyms is to substitute one of those terms of
equivalence for the word "involve."
This point becomes even clearer when one examines the relationship
between (d)(r) and (d)(2). Between these two subsections, Congress
made it clear that a "decision" has four parts to it. First, there is the
ascertainment of the controlling rule or rules of law. Second, there is a
determination of the facts. Third, there is an application of the
controlling rule to the facts. Fourth, this application produces a result
(disposition). The word "unreasonable" appears twice in § 2254(d), once
modifying "application of... federal law" and once modifying
"determination of the facts." 4s If "unreasonable application of... federal
law" means unreasonableness of the result, then subsection (d)(2) is
rendered superfluous. Any decision "that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts"'49 will necessarily represent an unreasonable
result. Indeed, there would have been no reason for Congress to separate
§ 2254(d) into two subsections if all Congress meant was to establish
unreasonableness review of results.
The statute should be construed in a way that makes sense of the
separation between (d)(i) and (d)(2). The assumption that appears to
underlie this section is that federal judges would review the state courts'
ascertainment of controlling rules de novo, the state courts'
determination of facts for reasonableness, and the state courts'
application of law to facts for reasonableness."0 As soon as one
substitutes "result" for "application," then the latter two types of review
collapse into one another. The "result" of a case is always a product of
fact determination and application of law to fact. The only way to
prevent these latter two types of review from collapsing into one another,
and thereby rendering subsection (d)(2) surplusage, is to interpret the
term "application" as meaning something like "analytical process" or
"reasoning process" as separate from the end result.
For that matter, reading "unreasonable application" as
"unreasonable result" would render the "contrary to" clause superfluous
as well. The Supreme Court has defined "contrary to" as follows:
[A] state court decision is "contrary to our clearly established
precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing
law set forth in our cases" or "if the state court confronts a set of facts
that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and
nevertheless arrives at a result different from our precedent." 5'
48. 28 U.S.C. § 22 5 4 (d).
49. Id.
50. This is the thrust of the Court's rejection of Justice Stevens' interpretation of the "contrary
to" clause in Williams, 529 U.S. at 425-27.
51. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405--06).
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According to this definition, "contrary to" encapsulates two
situations-first, where the state court applies the wrong rule; and
second, where the facts are on all fours with a Supreme Court decision
and the state court comes out the wrong way. Now assume arguendo that
we were to define "unreasonable application" as meaning "unreasonable
result." The "contrary to" clause does no independent work in this
scenario, for the result is always unreasonable when the state court
applies the wrong rule in a non-harmless manner. 2 By the same token,
the result is always unreasonable when the state court decides a case
indistinguishable from a Supreme Court precedent the opposite way.
Thus, if we read "unreasonable application" as meaning
"unreasonable result," neither the "contrary to" nor "unreasonable
determination of facts" clauses have any independent operation. Neither
of them would provide a basis for relief not already provided by the
"unreasonable application" clause. The majority in Williams v. Taylor
rejected Justice Stevens' interpretation of "contrary to" for precisely the
same type of reason-that it "saps the 'unreasonable application' clause
of any meaning."53 The Court found any such interpretation untenable.
"We must ...if possible, give meaning to every clause of the statute,"
Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court. 4 Interpreting "unreasonable
application" as "unreasonable analytical process" is the only way for the
Court to give meaning to every clause in § 2254(d).
In Wright v. Secretary for the Department of Corrections," an
Eleventh Circuit panel's textual analysis of § 2254(d)(I) came to a
contrary conclusion-that the federal court should review for
reasonableness of result. To see where the panel went wrong, one must
read a good deal of the analysis:
To start with, [petitioner] says that the district court should not have
given the state court's decision any deference under § 2254(d)(i),

because the rejection of this claim without any discussion of it does not
amount to the claim having been "adjudicated on the merits" in the
state court proceedings, which is a predicate for the application of
§ 2254(d)(I)....

...[T]he question here is whether the state court's summary, which
is to say unexplicated, rejection of the federal constitutional issue
qualifies as an adjudication under § 22 5 4(d) so that it is entitled to
deference....
...The plain language of § 2254(d)(i) requires only that the federal
claim have been "adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings"
and have "resulted in a decision" that is neither contrary to nor
52. Harmless error, of course, is not a ground for habeas relief. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507
U.S. 619,627 (I993); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967).
53. 529 U.S. at 407.
54- Id.
55. 278 F.3d 1245, 1254-56 (1ith Cir. 2002).
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involves an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.
That is all the text of the provision requires.
A judicial decision and a judicial opinion are not the same thing.
The chief responsibility of judges is to decide the case before them.
They may, or may not, attempt to explain the decision in an opinion.
The text of § 2254(d)(I) accepts this orthodox view. The statutory
languagefocuses on the result, not on the reasoningthat led to the result,

and nothing in that language requires the state court adjudication that
has resulted in a decision to be accompanied by an opinion that
explains the state court's rationale....
To conclude otherwise on this issue would be writing into
§ 2254(d)(i) an additional requirement that Congress did not put
there -a requirement
that the state courts explain the rationale of their
6
decisions.

The Wright Court may well be correct that a silent state court
decision is capable of constituting an "adjudication on the merits."57 But
whether or not Wright is correct on that score, it then jumps to the
conclusion that, if there has been an adjudication on the merits, the
federal habeas court must defer to any reasonable result of that
adjudication, irrespective of the state court's analysis. s The statute does
not so state. It generally prohibits relief in any case that was "adjudicated
on the merits" in state court, then recognizes a series of exceptions in
subsections (i) and (2). One of those exceptions is if the adjudication
"resulted in a decision that.., involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law." 9 If the decision did involve an
unreasonable application of federal law, then the federal court is 6not to
defer, even though the state court clearly did adjudicate the merits. o
Three points need to be made. One is that the Wright Court appears
to have analyzed the subsection (d)(i) in a vacuum, without regard to
subsection (d)(2). If it had considered the structure and relationship of
these subsections, it would have been forced to the conclusion that
"application" of law to fact and "determination" of facts must be treated
as separate parts of the decisional process leading to one end result. It
would have realized that the statute does not envision collapsing the two
into a single result, which would then be reviewed for reasonableness.
56. Id. at 1253-55 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
57. Although it should be noted that two of the commentators insist that a decision without
opinion is not an "adjudication on the merits." See Brittany Glidden, When the State is Silent: An
Analysis of AEDPA's Adjudication Requirement, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 177, 205-07

Adam Steinman, Reconceptualizing Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: How
Should AEDPA's Standardof Review OperateAfter Williams v. Taylor?, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 1493, 1529.
A third commentator makes a strong argument that an adjudication on the merits need not be
accompanied by an opinion. See Claudia Wilner, We Would Not Defer to That Which Did Not Exist:
AEDPA Meets the Silent State Court Opinion, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1442, 1461--64 (2002).
58. 278 F. 3 d at 1255-56.
(2001-2002);

59. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(I).
6o. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,398-99 (2000).
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Second, the Wright Court was flatly incorrect to say that "the
statutory language focuses on the result, not on the reasoning that led to
the result."'" The "application of federal law" that is "involved" in the
decision clearly alludes to the state court's reasoning process. Every
application of law to fact constitutes a reasoning process. As the
Supreme Court has already recognized in Williams v. Taylor, the
"unreasonable application" clause denotes "mixed questions of law and
fact," each of which calls for an application of law to fact. 6' The Wright
opinion zeroes in on the word "decision" at the cost of ignoring the
words "involved an unreasonable application of ...Federal law." 63 It is
true that the phrase "resulted in a decision" calls attention to the result,
but it is also true that the phrase "application of ...law" calls attention
to the reasoning process. These two statements are easily reconciled
when one realizes that the statute calls attention to the reasoning process
as a distinct part of what brings about an end result.
The third point is that the Wright opinion is misleading on the
subject of what it means for a federal court to "defer" under
§ 2254(d)(I). The court stated: "[T]he question here is whether the state
court's summary, which is to say unexplicated, rejection of the federal
constitutional issue qualifies as an adjudication under § 225 4(d) so that it
is entitled to deference. '' 6' This makes it sound as if, once the federal
court determines that the state court adjudicated the merits, the federal
court is supposed to then engage in some unspecified measure of ad
hoc deference to the state court's decision. The statute neither mandates
nor permits anything of the sort. Upon a finding that the state court has
adjudicated the merits, the statute then prohibits any grant of relief,
subject to the exceptions laid out in subsections (i) and (2). Subsection

(i) creates an exception for decisions involving an "unreasonable"
application of federal law, and subsection (2) creates an exception for
decisions based on an "unreasonable" determination of facts. 6' Congress
did not make exceptions for decisions involving "incorrect" applications
of federal law or decisions based on "incorrect" determinations of the
facts. The statute thus preserves a certain zone in which state courts can
be wrong but federal relief nonetheless may not issue. We may
colloquially refer to this zone as creating a type of deference. But
whatever "deference" is mandated by § 2254(d)(I) is already built into
the "unreasonable application of law" test. This phrase calls for
deference in the sense that the reviewing court is to withhold relief even
6i. 278 F.3d at 1255.
62. 529 U.S. at 384; see also Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1985); Evan Tsen Lee,
Principled Decisionmaking and the Proper Role of Federal Appellate Courts: The Mixed Questions
Conflict, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 235 (i990.
63. 28 U.S.C. § 225 4 (d)(I).
64. Wright, 278 F.3d at 1254.
65. 28 U.S.C. § 225 4 (d).
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when the state court decision is incorrect, so long as it is not
"unreasonable." There is no warrant for any other form of "deference,"
and particularly not for any ad hoc.deference to state court handiwork.66
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The legislative history of § 2254(d) in large part begins with
Professor Paul Bator's 1963 article entitled, Finalityin CriminalLaw and
Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners.6' Bator, one of the most
of thought,6
ardent followers of the so-called "Legal Process" school
argued that federal courts should have authority to grant habeas relief on
the basis of claims previously adjudicated by state courts-but only to the
degree that the state courts failed to accord such claims a "full and fair"
hearing.69 Picking up on the Realist premise that legal indeterminacy
makes it impossible to know whether any given outcome is truly correct,
Bator argued that the federal habeas courts should ask not whether the
state court's decision was right or wrong, but only whether its decisional
process assured "a reasoned probability that the facts were correctly
found and the law correctly applied."7 As Professor Yackle points out,
Bator's "full and fair" formulation attempted to import principles of
preclusion law into the law of habeas corpus.' Bator's formulation would
form the core of numerous attempts to revise federal habeas law over the
next thirty years.72
On June 17, 1963, shortly after Bator's article was published, the
Committee on Habeas Corpus proposed an amendment to pending
habeas legislation. The Committee, composed of five circuit judges,
proposed that state court findings of fact be presumed correct unless at
least one of seven extenuating circumstances was present. Among the
66. Larry Yackle made this point when the statute was first enacted. See Yackle, supra note 7, at
413.
67. Paul Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and FederalHabeas Corpus for State Prisoners,76 HARV.
L. REV. 441 (1963).
68. On the "Legal Process" school generally, see infra Part IV.
69. Bator probably got the "full and fair" formulation from Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, It8

(1944) (citations omitted):
Where the state courts have considered and adjudicated the merits of his contentions, and
this Court has either reviewed or declined to review the state court's decision, a federal
court will not ordinarily reexamine upon writ of habeas corpus the questions thus
adjudicated. But where resort to state court remedies has failed to afford a full and fair
adjudication of the federal contentions raised, either because the state affords no remedy,
or because in the particular case the remedy afforded by state law proves in practice
unavailable or seriously inadequate, a federal court should entertain his petition for habeas
corpus, else he would be remediless. In such a case he should proceed in the federal district
court before resorting to this Court by petition for habeas corpus.
The Supreme Court re-injected the "full and fair" concept into habeas corpus law in Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 469 (1976). The Court hadearlier rejected the idea in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,
426-28 (1963).
70. Bator, supra note 67, at 455.
71. Yackle, supra note 7, at 424.
72.

See infra Part IV.
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seven circumstances was "that the applicant did not receive a full and fair
hearing in the state court proceeding."73 The proposal was never enacted.
In 1973, Senator Roman Hruska proposed legislation that would have
required federal habeas courts to give "conclusive weight" to previous
state judgments, provided that petitioners were given "an adequate
opportunity to have full and fair consideration" of their claims in state
court.74 The bill never reached the Senate floor.75
The Reagan Administration continued the push for a "full and fair"
plan, but it was no longer Professor Bator's version. According to
Professor Yackle, the need for political acceptability drove the
administration to redefine "full and fair":
[A] state adjudication would be full and fair in the sense of the
proposed subsection (d) if: (i) the claim at issue was actually
considered and decided on the merits in state proceedings; (ii) the
factual determination of the state court, the disposition resulting from
its application of the law to the facts, and its view of the applicable rule
of federal law were reasonable; (iii) the adjudication was consistent
with the procedural requirements of federal law; and (iv) there is no
new evidence of substantial importance which could not reasonably
no
have been produced at the time of the state adjudication and
subsequent change of law of substantial importance has occurred. 6
It is important to note that this proposal broke with its "full and fair"
predecessors in at least two ways. First, it moved very far away from
principles of preclusion law. Federal habeas courts would not have been
required to confine their examination to the formal adequacy of state
court process; they would have been authorized to grant relief if the state
court had acted unreasonably in determining the law or facts, or in
applying the law to the facts. Second, and equally importantly, a key
portion of the proposal broke entirely with the ideology of the "Legal
Process" school that had animated Bator's work. By authorizing relief in
cases where the state court's "disposition resulting from its application of
the law to the facts" was unreasonable, the proposal explicitly focused on
results. 77 Even more relevant to our present purposes, the proposal
specified that the federal court was to gauge the reasonableness of the
state court's "disposition," not the reasonableness of its "application of
the law to the facts.,,8 But the Reagan Administration was unable to get
this or similar proposals enacted into law.79
73. Report of the Committee on Habeas Corpus, 33 F.R.D. 363, 381 (1964). The report explicitly
cited Bator's article. See id. at 380.
74. Yackle, supra note 7, at 425-26.
75. Id. at 426.
76. The Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1982: Hearings on S. 2216 Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary,9 7 th Cong. 98 (1982) (analysis of bill text).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Yackle, supra note 7, at 428.
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In 199I, Representative Henry Hyde offered a bill containing
something similar to the original "full and fair" plan, but the Judicial
8° Hyde then withdrew his original
Conference would not accept it.
proposal and offered a substitute containing the following provision:
An adjudication of a claim in State proceedings is full and fair within
the meaning of this section... unless the adjudication(i)

was conducted in a manner inconsistent with the procedural

requirements

of Federal law that are applicable to the State

proceeding;
(2) was contrary to or involved an arbitrary or unreasonable
interpretation or application of clearly established Federal law; or

(3)involved an arbitrary or unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence presented."
As Professor Yackle emphasizes, this proposal was significantly
different from the original "full and fair" proposal it supplanted.8 2 "It is
true that the Judicial Conference was unhappy with the full and fair
standard until we offered an amendment which covers more than just
procedural reasonableness," Hyde admitted." Indeed, the proposal
authorized relief if the state court adjudication "was contrary to ...
clearly established Federal law," an inquiry having nothing to do with
procedural
reasonableness."' But it would be a mistake to assume that the
phrase "involved
an arbitrary or unreasonable interpretation or
application of clearly established Federal law" had nothing do to with
procedural reasonableness. 8' Subsection (3) included the phrase
' 6
"involved an arbitrary or unreasonable determination of the facts."
Thus, the proposal clearly contemplated the "reasonableness" review of
law application separate from the "reasonableness" review of fact
determination. Unlike the Reagan Administration proposal, it did not
authorize "reasonableness" review for the "disposition" of law
application. This must mean that federal courts were to review the
process of law application (and the process of fact determination) for
reasonableness. Indeed, if "unreasonable application of Federal law" and
"unreasonable determination of the facts" meant unreasonable result,
they would be totally redundant. Although it is true that the Hyde
substitute permitted the federal courts to review for more than just
procedural reasonableness, it hardly did away with considerations of
procedural reasonableness. In the end, the Hyde substitute was rejected
8o. Id. at 430-31.
8i. 137 CONG. REC. H7996 (daily ed. Oct. I7,199i).
82.

83.
84.
85.
86.

Yackle, supra note 7, at 431.
137 CONG. REC. H7895 (daily ed. Oct. 6, I99').
137 CONG. REC. H7996 (daily ed. Oct. 7,I99I).
Id.
Id.
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by the House.
In 1995, Representative Christopher Cox proposed legislation that

borrowed heavily from the Hyde substitute:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
with respect to any claim that was decided on the merits in State
proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim(i) resulted in a decision that was based on an arbitrary or
unreasonable interpretation of clearly established Federal law as
articulated in the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States;
resulted in a decision that was based on an arbitrary or
unreasonable application to the facts of clearly established Federal law
as articulated in the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States; or
(2)

(3)resulted in a decision that was based on an arbitrary or
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State proceeding.8

This proposal did not include subsection (i) of the Hyde substitute,
addressed to "procedural requirements" of federal law. Nor did it retain
the "full and fair" phrase, which had already been rendered surplusage in
the Hyde substitute because of the enumeration of specific exceptions. In
other respects, however, the Cox proposal was similar to the Hyde
substitute.
Following the demise of the Cox proposal, Senators Orrin Hatch and
Arlen Specter co-sponsored a bill that split the ideological difference
between them concerning relitigation of claims in federal habeas
proceedings.89 This, finally, is the proposal that became the habeas corpus
portion of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
including § 2254(d). 9 The Hatch-Specter proposal took the same generic
structure of the Cox proposal, but there was one notable difference.
Hatch-Specter reached back to the Hyde substitute for the phrase
involved "[an] unreasonable.., application of clearly established Federal
law."9' This, of course, is the language now in question. Does it call for
the "reasonableness" review of state court decisions (results) or of state
court analytical processes?
The contemporaneous statements of the proposal's authors are

87. Yackle, supra note 7, at 432.
88. 141 CONG. REC. H1424 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1995).
89. Senator John Kyl complimented the Hatch-Specter proposal for making it more difficult for

prisoners to press claims in federal court, but criticized the proposal for failing to bar prisoners from
federal court altogether. Yackle, supra note 7, at 399 (citing 141 CONG. REC. S7829 (daily ed. June 7,
1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl)).
go. Yackle, supra note 7, at 436.
91. See 137 CONG. REc. H7996 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1991).
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notable mostly for their banality. Senator Hatch said of § 2254(d): "[T]his
standard essentially gives the Federal court the authority to review, de
novo, whether the State court decided the claim in contravention of
Federal law."'92 This suggests free review, but in the same statement,
Hatch interpreted his own remarks:
What does this mean? It means that if the State court reasonably
applied Federal law, its decision must be upheld. Why is this a
problematic standard? After all, Federal habeas review exists to
correct fundamental defects in the law. After the State court has
reasonably applied
Federal law it is hard to say that a fundamental
"
defect exists.

If these remarks were less than illuminating, the remarks of Senator
Specter were no more instructive. "So there still is latitude for the
Federal judge to disagree with the determination made by the State court
judge," he said.' "It is my sense, having litigated these cases ... that
where there is a miscarriage of justice, the Federal court can come to a
different decision than was made in the State court proceedings."' The
most that can be gleaned from Hatch's and Specter's comments is that
they envisioned the availability of federal relief in the event of some kind
of basic failure by the state courts. Hatch referred to "fundamental
defect"; Specter spoke of "miscarriages of justice." Neither of these is
necessarily inconsistent with either reasonableness review for results or
reasonableness review for analytical processes. "Fundamental defect"
sounds vaguely process-based, while "miscarriage of justice" sounds
more bottom-line. But an unreasonable result can be described as
"fundamentally defective," and a profound breakdown in the application
of law to facts could certainly be called a "miscarriage of justice." Thus,
the floor debates are inconclusive. But the fact that Hatch-Specter lifted
the phrase involved ' Jan] unreasonable... application of clearly
established Federal law" from the Hyde substitute is highly significant
because of the Hyde substitute's evident concern for the reasonableness
of the law application process. So, although the legislative history is
hardly unambiguous, the best evidence supports review for the
reasonableness of the state court's analytical process in applying the law
to the facts.
IV.

INTELLECTUAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY

The legislative history just recited bristles with references to
Professor Bator's "full and fair" thesis, first articulated in his 1963 article,

92. 142 CONG. REC. S3446-47 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch).

93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
141 CONG. REC.

S7847 (daily ed. June 7,

1995) (statement of Sen. Specter).

Id.
See 137 CONG. REc. H7996 (daily ed. Oct. i7, 199).
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Finality in CriminalLaw and FederalHabeas Corpusfor State Prisoners.'
The thesis holds that federal habeas courts should not relitigate federal
constitutional claims unless they were denied a full and fair hearing in
state court. 8 As Professor Yackle points out, this comes quite close to a
preclusion doctrine, which in turn explains why liberals bear such
antagonism toward it.' If the "full and fair" program were law,
petitioners could not raise their federal claims in federal court unless
there had been some monstrous corruption of the state court process,
such as a mob-dominated trial, 1"° bribery of the judge, or a guilty plea
produced by torture. '
As we have just seen, there have been many conservatives '
throughout the years who favored just such a rule, or something very
close to it."° The Parker proposal was obviously akin to the Bator thesis,
as was the Hruska proposal. Years later, Representative Hyde's original
proposal was also clearly the progeny of Bator's thesis. Those
antagonistic to the "full and fair" thesis are unquestionably correct to
point out that Congress never approved any of its iterations. Liberals and
moderates always raised enough concern about "full and fair" to prevent
it from being codified." There is simply no plausible argument that
AEDPA and its new § 2254(d) codifies the norm that federal courts may
hear federal claims only when they were denied a full and fair hearing in
state court.
It is, however, quite another thing to say that the rejection of the
"full and fair" thesis proper also represents the rejection of the larger
intellectual movement out of which the thesis grew. If one looks carefully
at the succession of reform proposals through the years, a pattern
emerges. 5 Conservatives want to limit the relitigation of federal claims
to some subset of cases where state court process went off the rails. At
first, they argue for something very like Bator's vision of the calamitous
abridgement of process -essentially, where the Due Process Clause itself
97. Bator, supra note 67.
98. Id. at 495-96.
99. Yackle, supra note 7, at 402-03.
loo. See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 9o-9i (1923); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309,347 (1915)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
tol. See Bator, supra note 67, at 455. Justice Stevens later endorsed Bator's examples (with slight
amendment). See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 544 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102. There are conservatives of all stripes, just as there are liberals of all kinds. The prominent
commentator George F. Will refers to the conservative subgroup that holds a special affinity for
"Legal Process" tenets as "[t]he conservative faction that focuses on constitutionalism and democratic
due process." George F. Will, A Questionable Kind of Conservatism, WASH. POST, July 24, 2003, at
A21.

103. See, e.g., Yackle, supra note 7, at 430-31.

o
Io4. See supra notes 76, 89, 9 , and accompanying text; 137 CONG. REC. H7996 (daily ed. Oct. 17,

t991); 137 CONG. REC. H7895 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1991).

1o5. For a history of the "full and fair" concept in habeas reform efforts, see Larry W. Yackle, The
Habeas Hagioscope,66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331, 2357. 2364 (1993).
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is violated, or where the defendant has been rendered constitutionally
inadequate assistance of counsel, or where the state court completely
lacked jurisdiction. But these conservative advocates fail to gain
sufficient support for a formulation so restrictive, and succeeding
generations of conservatives gradually loosen the restrictions. The
Reagan Administration proposal does not confine the federal court's
review to whether there has been an opportunity to be heard, but rather
expands review to include the reasonableness of the disposition, given
the law and facts. After unsuccessfully pushing the original "full and fair"
thesis, Hyde offers a substitute that goes even farther than the Reagan
Administration proposal. Hyde's substitute expands federal court review
to the reasonableness of the "interpretation and application,".not just the
"disposition." Cox's proposal would have authorized relief for a
petitioner who demonstrated that the state court decision was based on
an unreasonable application of federal law. Finally, Hatch-Specter
becomes law and authorizes review for a decision that "involves an
unreasonable application" of federal law.
Although the line is not entirely unbroken, one sees a succession of
conservative-backed proposals to focus federal habeas review on the
process of the state court. In the beginning, the notion of what
constitutes "process" is very narrow. Out of a need to win broader
approval, the proposers eventually accept a much broader notion of what
constitutes state court process, including the state court's analysis. So,
although it is certainly true that the Congress that enacted the AEDPA
rejected Bator's "full and fair" thesis, it is anything but clear that it
rejected the general process orientation of which Bator's scholarship was
so characteristic."" On the contrary, it appears that most of the
succeeding generations of conservative sponsors sought to preserve as
much of that process orientation as was consistent with winning sufficient
moderate support for enactment.
Why should it matter whether those who supported Hatch-Specter
embraced the general "Legal Process" approach in the habeas corpus
area? The answer is simple: it is virtually inconceivable that anyone
moved by the Legal Process credo would want the availability of federal
habeas relief to turn on the reasonableness of the state court's result
rather than on the reasonableness of its analysis. One of the basic
premises of the Legal Process approach, and Bator's main premise, was
that, in the real world, human inquiry can only ever approximate
metaphysical truth."° We cannot ever know for sure whether a person is
io6. There is no doubt that Paul Bator's scholarship grew out of the so-called Legal Process
tradition. See Charles Fried, Paul M. Bator, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 419, 420 (1989) (locating Bator's
scholarship in the tradition of James Bradley Thayer, Felix Frankfurter, Henry Hart, and Louis Jaffe).
IO7. "[W]e can never absolutely recreate past phenomena and thus can never have final certainty
as to their existence .... Bator, supranote 67, at 447.
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truly guilty or innocent-we can only establish the best process for
approximating this truth and then abide by whatever result the process
reaches."" That was precisely Bator's argument, and it explains why he
advocated for federal court review to focus on the adequacy of the
process rather than the ultimate correctness of the result.
It is highly doubtful that Bator would have been any more
enthusiastic about federal courts reviewing for the "reasonableness" of
the result than for the "correctness" of it. How can a court gauge the
reasonableness of a result without reaching an independent judgment
about the ultimate Truth, then measuring how close the result below
comes to this independent judgment? Since Bator and other Legal
Process mavens had little confidence in the ability of any court to
discover the actual Truth, it would make no sense for them to support
review of the result for reasonableness."° Those within the process
tradition flatly rejected the notion that only results mattered. Bator's
mentor, Henry Hart, once wrote that when the Legal Realists held that
"[i]t is not what the judges say which is important but what they do," this
was tantamount to the "monstrous conclusion that reason and argument,
In other words, without
the conscious search for justice, are vain ....
reason, there is no justice.
Bator's focus on reasoning instead of results was perfectly in line
with the beliefs of others in the Legal Process movement. One of Bator's
predecessors in the movement, fellow Harvard Law School professor
Lon Fuller, once stated that judicial activity is predicated on reason-it
"cannot be... talked about meaningfully, except in terms of reasons that
give rise to it ....
Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, in their famous set of
unfinished teaching materials named The Legal Process, urged the study
of reasoning in judicial opinions. They insisted that it was important to
look "not only to the rightness or wrongness of the particular result but
to the validity of the process by which the court arrived at it....
According to legal historian Neil Duxbury, Hart and Sacks believed that

io8. According to Professor Bator:
Our analysis of the purposes of the habeas corpus jurisdiction must, thus, come to terms
with the possibility of error inherent in any process. The task of assuring legality is to define
and create a set of arrangements and procedures which provide a reasoned and acceptable
probability that justice will be done, that the facts found will be "true" and the law applied

"correct."

Bator, supra note 67, at 448.
IO9. At least one other commentator has made this observation. See Steinman, supra note 57, at
1535.
iIo. Henry Hart, Holmes' Positivism-An Addendum, 64 HARV. L. REV.929,933 (951).
iii. Lon L. Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case Law, 59 HARV. L. REv. 376, 386 (1946).

112. Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in American Jurisprudence, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 6oi, 663-64 (1993) (quoting Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal
Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law (1958) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author)).
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"the presence or absence of reasoned elaboration in a judicial decision is
the primary indication of whether or not it is sound."...3 Indeed, the very
phrase "reasoned elaboration" captures one of the essential tenets of the
Legal Process credo. "Reasoned Elaboration... 'came to summarize
those ideals and standards," wrote legal historian G. Edward White." 4
Nothing was more important to Bator's view of the craft of judging than
reason. As Charles Fried wrote upon Bator's untimely death, "above all
he had one subject: the law as reason and reasonableness."" 5
My point is not that Paul Bator's first choice would have been in
favor of federal habeas review of state court analytical process for
reasonableness. He wanted to restrict review to whether the state had
given an adequately represented petitioner a meaningful opportunity to
be heard by a court of competent jurisdiction. " 6 This was his "full and
fair" thesis. Denied this option, however, Bator would clearly have
chosen review for the reasonableness of the state court's analytical
process. More specifically, if Bator (or most other Legal Process
adherents) had been forced to elect between reasonableness review of
the result or reasonableness review of the state court's reasoningprocess,
there is no question he and they would have chosen the latter."7 So long
as the reasoning process was analytically reputable-that is, so long as
the state court sincerely considered the applicable norms in light of the
facts supported by the record-the federal court should deny relief, no
matter what the result. This is a simple logical extension of Bator's thesis.
It could be argued that, if the federal court cannot ascertain the state
court's reasoning process, Bator would then have wanted the federal
court to review the result for reasonableness. I think this unlikely. The
thrust of Bator's thesis is that, in a world with epistemological limits, the
only valid way to evaluate a result is to evaluate the process by which the
result was reached.118 If Court #2 wants to evaluate Court #i's result, it
will examine the methods by which Court #i took evidence, heard
argument, found facts, and applied controlling norms to those facts. If

113. Id. at664.
114. G. Edward White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration:Jurisprudential Criticism and
Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279, 286 (1973).
115. Charles Fried, In Memoriam: Paul M. Bator, io2 HARV. L. REV. 1739, 1739 (989).
II6. "What is ... so hard for me to grasp is why the existence of habeas to cure failure of state
process justifies its present reach to cases where there has not been such a failure of process." Bator,
supra note 67, at 552.
117. The entire tenor of Bator's argument rested upon the apotheosis of reason over result.
I18. In his 1963 article Bator stated:
I have said that, presumptively, a process fairly and rationally adapted to the task of finding
the facts and applying the law should not be repeated. This suggests that it is always an
appropriate inquiry whether previous process was meaningful process, that is, whether the
conditions and tools of inquiry were such as to assure a reasoned probability that the facts
were correctlyfound and the law correctly applied.
Bator, supra note 67, at 455.
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those methods were acceptable in some sense, if they surmounted a given
threshold of methodological validity, then the result was to be accepted.
The only other way to evaluate Court #i's result is to develop an
independent conclusion about the case, with no direct reference to Court
#i's process, and then to determine whether Court #I's result falls within
a tolerable radius surrounding this independent conclusion. From the
process perspective, this makes little sense. In the absence of any reason
to think that Court #2's methodology is superior to Court #i's, then there
is no reason to test Court #I's result against Court #2's result. As a
matter of first principles, someone like Professor Bator would have
dismissed the value of Court #2's review if the reasoning process of Court
#i were unknowable. There is no reason to think Court #2 could do a
better job in reaching its own result, and so it should not try. Otherwise,
what is to prevent the infinite regress into Courts #3, #4, #5, and so on?
In the words of Professor Bator:
After all, there is no ultimate guarantee that any tribunal arrived at the
correct result; the conclusions of a habeas corpus court, or of any
number of habeas corpus courts, that the facts were X and that on X
facts Y law applies are not infallible; if the existence vel non of mistake
determines the lawfulness of the judgment, there can be no escape
from a literally endless relitigation of the merits because the possibility
of mistake always exists.'
But those who believed in the normative primacy of reasoned
elaboration would have recognized two overriding reasons to permit
Court #2's independent review where Court #i's reasoning process is
undisclosed and unknowable. Simply put, those in the Legal Process
tradition believed in nothing more strongly than the duty of a court to
give reasons for its actions.'20 This belief is relevant to the issue at hand in
two ways. First, the principle of reasoned elaboration would strongly
disapprove of depriving one's liberty without any explanation. If the state
courts chose not to give any explanation, then the principle of reasoned
elaboration would favor independent review on the part of the federal
court, which would then articulate its analysis. Second, to deny Court #2
any review of -Court #i's work on the ground that Court #i did not
disclose its reasoning is to reward Court #i for failing to give reasons.
Denying review would be to insulate the very decisions that are most
suspect in the Legal Process universe-those made purely by fiat. In a
case where the state court's reasoning process was undisclosed, Bator
and like thinkers would have seen little or no value in review of the result
for reasonableness. They would have seen value in federal de novo
review, not because it would be likely to reach a superior result, but
simply because it would encourage state courts to give their reasons.
119. Bator, supranote 67, at 447.
12o. Duxbury, supra note I12, at 663-64.
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Before moving into a thoroughgoing policy discussion, however,
something should be said about the political history of habeas corpus
reform. Many, if not most, law-and-order conservatives in Congress
embraced not only Bator's "full and fair" thesis in particular, but Legal
Process philosophy in general.'' Doubtless they embraced these ideas for
a variety of reasons, but largely they saw Legal Process as a powerful tool
for criticizing the "liberal activism" of the Warren Court.'22 The Legal
Process philosophy was associated with academics of great reputation at
Harvard and Columbia, many of whom were themselves political liberals,
yet who had expressed serious reservations about the Warren Court's
methodology.'23 These academics preached the importance of craft,
process, and intellectual integrity in judicial decisionmaking. No Legal
Process scholarship had greater visibility than Professor Herbert
Wechsler's Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,'24 in which
he confessed that he could not see how Brown v. Board of Education'5
or the "white primary" decisions could be considered principled.
Another high-visibility member of the Legal Process set was Professor
Alexander Bickel, whose book The Supreme Court and the Idea of
Progresscriticized the Court for betting on the future rather than sticking
to the Constitution and the precedents before it.' In an earlier book,
The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics,
Bickel had advocated the use of the so-called justiciability doctrines
(standing, mootness, and ripeness) to duck controversial cases that might
have resulted in unprincipled decisions.'27 Bickel's arguments generally
appealed to such conservatives as President Richard Nixon appointed to
the Supreme Court.""
121. These are the conservatives George Will refers to as the "democratic due process" faction.
See supra note 102.

See, e.g., Gary Peller, In Defense of FederalHabeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
579, 676 (1982): "[T]he premises and assumptions of [Bator's] process-oriented approach are
unacceptable because they carry an inherently biased and benign view of state courts." And: "the
substantive biases of state courts during certain historical periods reveals the distributive judgments
underlying process theorists' purportedly managerial choices." Id. at 683.
123. See, e.g., Alexander Bickel & Harry Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process:
The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1 (957); Ernest J. Brown, Foreword: Process of Law, 72
HARV. L. REV. 77 (1958) (criticizing the Warren Court's increasing practice of granting certiorari and
simultaneously reversing without opinion); Henry M. Hart, Jr., Foreword: The Time Chart of the
Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1959) (in particular criticizing the technical shortcomings of Justice
Brennan's opinion in the habeas case of Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394 (959)).
124. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. I, 33
('959).
125. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
126. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 98-100 (1970). For the
i22.

REV.

liberal response, see J. Skelly Wright, Professor Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme
Court,84 HARV. L. REV. 769 (971).
127. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 569-70 (1962).
128. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on
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I do not claim that all conservatives on Capitol Hill had read the
writings of Herbert Wechsler, Alexander Bickel, or Paul Bator, but there
is no doubt that criticism of the Warren Court on grounds of
unprincipled decisionmaking and shoddy craft resonated deeply with the
types of conservatives who for more than thirty years called for habeas
corpus reform. They saw liberal federal judges undoing the work of state
courts simply because these judges wanted to reach results more
consistent with their then-modern views of shared blame for criminality
and the possibilities of rehabilitation.' 9 Conservatives were angered over
this perceived result orientation of federal habeas courts. Litigation had
to be allowed to reach a state of repose; convicts could not be given an
unlimited number of bites at the apple. Federal courts could not be
permitted consistently to undo the handiwork of state courts that had
conscientiously applied controlling federal law to the facts of the cases
before them. The process had to mean something. This is why Bator's
"full and fair" plan became the centerpiece of conservative reform
efforts for almost three decades.
It would be more than ironic if conservatives now were to advocate
review for reasonableness of the result rather than review for
reasonableness of the process. If conservatives were to take that position
now, it would cast grave doubt on the sincerity of thirty years of
arguments by conservative habeas reform advocates, who insisted that
the federal courts should concern themselves almost exclusively with the
quality of the state court's processes rather than with the result. As I
have already pointed out, there is nothing in the statute's text that
requires an interpretation in favor of review for reasonableness of the
result-indeed, quite the opposite.'3" In the absence of some overriding
policy reason, which I shall examine in the next section, the only
plausible reason for favoring review for reasonableness of the result
would be general antipathy toward prisoners.' 3 ' But such a stance lacks
principle. The principled position for conservatives would be to embrace
review for reasonableness of the process because such a doctrine would
dovetail with the process orientation of their reform proposals since the
early I960s.
Some circuit decisions embracing review for reasonableness of the
result have offered a contrary appraisal of AEDPA's political history.
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, oo MICH. L. REv. 2062, 2380 (2002) ("[T]he Nixonappointed Justices embraced a more conservative legal process jurisprudence, associated with the
older Felix Frankfurter, John Harlan, Alexander Bickel, Paul Bator, Philip Kurland, and others.").
129. See, e.g., the statement by Sen. Orrin Hatch: "[I1f you can get your habeas petition before the
right liberal Federal judge, you can get out of State prison, regardless of your innocence or guilt." 141
CONo. REC. S7 84 8 (daily ed. June 7, 1995), quoted in Thomas C. Martin, The Comprehensive Terrorism
Prevention Act of1995, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 201, 239 (1996).
130. See supra Part II.
131. See infra Part V.
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Judge Posner's opinion for the panel in Hennon v. Cooper considers and
rejects review for reasonableness of the state court's analytical process:
[W]e do not think the approach is correct. It would place the federal
court in just the kind of tutelary relation to the state courts that the
recent amendments are designed to end. It would be less appropriate
than in the parallel area of administrative review, where the court can
remand the case to the administrative agency for a better articulation
of its grounds.... A federal court in a habeas corpus proceeding
cannot remand the case to the state appellate court for a clarification
of that court's opinion; all it can do is order a new trial, though the
defendant may have been the victim not of any constitutional error but
merely of a failure of judicial articulateness.' 3

In this passage, the Hennon court raises two points, one about the
relationship between federal habeas courts and state courts, and the
other about the possibility of improvident grants of relief brought about
by the federal court's inability to ask for clarification of state courts'
opinions.
Let us first examine the point about not wanting to create the image
of federal courts "tutoring" state courts on what constitutes proper legal
analysis. The court in Wright v. Secretary for Department of Corrections
put the point most sharply:
Telling state courts when and how to write opinions to accompany
their decisions is no way to promote comity. Requiring state courts to
put forward rationales for their decisions so that federal courts can
examine their thinking smacks of a33"grading papers" approach that is
outmoded in the post-AEDPA era.
There is undoubtedly some truth to this assertion as a matter of
political history. Many members of Congress who voted for AEDPA
obviously felt that federal courts were acting too brusquely in conducting
habeas review. I34 The problem is that this particular political sentiment
does not favor review for reasonableness of the result over review for
reasonableness of the analysis. This requires some explanation.
Let us assume for the moment that the sentiment expressed in the
passages quoted above represents a principle that must be honored
during the interpretation of AEDPA. What is the content of that
principle? The quoted passage invokes the metaphor of an instructor
correcting or evaluating the work of a student. The federal habeas courts,
it is said, may not act as if they occupy the position of the instructor. Of
course, this is only a metaphor; state courts do not actually enroll in
classes taught by federal courts. What, then, is the principle behind the
metaphor?
132.

109 F.3d 330, 335 (7th Cir. 1997).

133. 278 F.3d 1245, 1255 (i ith Cir. 2002) (citing Hennon, lO9 F.3 d at 335). For similar language, see
Santellan v. Cockrell, 271 F.3d 190, 193 (5th Cir. 2ooi).
134. See supra note 92.
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Assume for the moment that § 2254(d) embodies a principle
militating against federal court evaluation of state court work product.
This principle is arguably bolstered by the fact that federal habeas courts
do not formally review state judgments. Federal habeas corpus tests the
legality of the petitioner's custody simpliciter,which distinguishes it from
a direct appeal.'35 Review for reasonableness of the state court's
analytical process constitutes an evaluation of the state court's work, runs
the argument, and so the Supreme Court should be disinclined to
interpret § 2254(d) in that way. But what about review for
reasonableness of the result? Does this not also constitute an evaluation
of the state court's work? I do not see how it can be otherwise. The only
difference is that, when a federal court finds a state court's analysis to be
unreasonable, it implies that the state court has poor academic skills,
whereas when it finds the state court's result to be unreasonable, it
implies that the state court has poor judgment. I cannot imagine that the
members of Congress who voted for the AEDPA would have thought
the second preferable to the first. There are plenty of state judges who
would gladly admit to their deficiencies as scholars, but not many who
would happily confess to having poor judgment.
It might be argued that review for reasonableness of the result is
more appropriate precisely because it constitutes an evaluation of the
state court's judgment. Judgment is the essence of judging, and therefore
(the argument would go) state judges do not so much mind having their
judgment questioned. Exercising judgment, after all, is their job. They do
not like being evaluated on their scholarly performance because (the
argument would continue) writing opinions is not really the essence of
their job. To return to the tutorial metaphor for a moment, an art student
doesn't so much mind being graded on the artfulness of his work, but will
resent being graded on how he arranges the paintbrushes in his palette.
This argument does not resonate with me at all. Writing opinions is
not a frivolous or tangential part of judging. Reasoning and giving
reasons are integral parts of the judicial function.' They are a big part of
what separates judicial action from brute fiat. Imagine how a judge feels
when she carefully writes an opinion documenting her reasoning process,
and the reviewing court then overturns the result as "unreasonable"
without so much as a comment about or acknowledgment of her
reasoning process. No one likes having his or her work picked apart in
135. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 430-31 (1963), overruled on other grounds, Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U.S. 722,750-51 (99).
136. "Reasoned elaboration" -the process of explaining how general norms apply to specific
situations-was a central credo of the Legal Process school. See, e.g., Duxbury, supranote i 12, at 63839 (noting that Alex Bickel and Harry Wellington believed that reasoned elaboration was the
Supreme Court's "real strength"); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart & Wechsler
Paradigm,47 VAND. L. REV. 953, 966 (1994) (asserting that "[r]eason and reasoned elaboration are the
stuff of the judicial process").
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public, but it is hardly obvious why having one's analysis brushed aside as
irrelevant is preferable. 3
There is no doubt that many supporters of the AEDPA wanted the
statute to serve as a rebuke to what they perceived as arrogant liberal
federal judges who had run roughshod over state criminal convictions
since the heady days of the Warren Court. I31 Some of this sentiment
frankly grew out of the social conservative antipathy toward prisoners. 39'
For better or worse, the judiciary cannot use "antipathy toward
prisoners" as an interpretive principle, since it has no logical limits and
therefore provides no guidance. (Imagine an "interpretive principle"
stating that all ambiguities in the statute shall be resolved against the
prisoner. This would be the equivalent of saying that all ambiguities in
the Federal Employee Liability Act should be resolved in favor of the
plaintiff because Congress was motivated to enact FELA by a sympathy
for injured employees!).
As I have just discussed, however, some supporters of AEDPA were
not motivated by antipathy toward prisoners alone. They were motivated
by a sense, articulated superbly by Professor Bator, that there must be
finality in criminal proceedings, and that federal judges do not have a
corner on Truth or Good Judgment. 4 Therefore, the only justification
for collateral federal review is to ensure that the process was sound.
Although, as the result of political compromise, AEDPA conceptualizes
"process" much more broadly than did Professor Bator, the same basic
principle unmistakably underlies § 2254(d). It is this principle-that the
review of state court decisions focus on process rather than on resultthat can, and should, serve as an interpretive norm in this area.
The Hennon court's second argument was that review for
reasonableness of the analysis would lead to cases in which federal courts
granted relief merely because the state court had expressed itself
inarticulately. 4 ' It is fair to ask why a federal habeas court should review
the reasonableness of the state court's analysis in a case where the state
court's result is reasonable on its face. Let us suppose a state court
affirms a conviction, and that the affirmance seems reasonable. All we
can mean by this is that the reviewing court can conceive of at least one
valid rationale to support the result. Let us further suppose that the state
137. The old saying among academics is that the worst fate for one's scholarship is not to be
criticized, but ignored.
138. Yackle, supra note 105, at 2349-57 (chronicling the "conservative backlash" against the
criminal procedure decisions of the Warren Court and the resulting "law-and-order" movement that
helped propel Nixon to the presidency).
139. Id. at 2349 ("The crime rate [in the i96os] was rising, people were frightened, and society
needed someone or something to blame."). Yackle notes that this feeling continued through the
Reagan and first Bush administration. Id. at 2351-53.
14o. Steinman, supra note 57, at 1535.
I4. Hennon v. Cooper, IO9 F.3 d 330, 334-35 (7th Cir. 1997).
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court has written an opinion explaining its decision, and that the
explanation -is objectively unreasonable, which is to say that the state
court has relied upon an invalid rationale. Why should a federal habeas
court issue relief in such a case, given that all the state court must do is to
disavow its original opinion and write a new one adopting the federal
habeas court's valid rationale?'"
The answer is simply that the federal habeas court cannot know
whether the state court would continue to affirm the conviction if it could
not do so on its original grounds. It may well be that the state court does
not think the federal habeas court's rationale valid. Told that its original
rationale is impermissible, the state court may conclude that there is no
valid ground to sustain the conviction, even if the federal habeas court
thinks one exists. I am willing to concede that this scenario will be fairly
uncommon. The state court will usually reinstate its original judgment
based on the ground identified by the federal court as being valid. But
the statistical rarity of this situation does not make it futile for federal
courts to grant relief. The state courts must be given an opportunity to
overturn convictions they now think unsupportable on any valid ground,
even if they would not often exercise that opportunity. It would be truly
arrogant for federal courts simply to assume that state judges wish for
their decisions to be upheld on grounds they themselves would not think
valid.
V.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

The most obvious policy objection to my argument is that it will
force already overworked state appellate courts to write opinions. I am
well aware that an integral part of appellate courts' response to caseload
pressures has been an increasing use of summary dispositions, including
summary affirmances of denials of relief in state habeas proceedings.'43 It
is also true that this trend would trouble scholars in the Legal Process
tradition, for the duty of reasoned elaboration was a large part of what
separated legitimate judicial power from brute fiat. I4" But federal habeas
review for reasonableness of the process would not come close to
requiring opinions in all state criminal appeals. Such a rule merely
creates an incentive for state courts to write opinions in those cases
where they feel deference from federal courts is most important. Where
the state court has documented its analysis in an opinion, the federal
court could grant relief only if it concludes that the state court's
analytical process is objectively unreasonable. Where the state court has
left its analysis undocumented, the federal court would not automatically

142.

I am indebted to Anne Lackey for this point.

143. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (991).

144. See supra Part IV (discussing reasoned elaboration).
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remand the case to state court for an opinion-indeed, a federal habeas
court has no authority for any such remand.'45 The federal court would
simply perform a de novo review of the decision.
So let it be clear that I would not require anything of state courts
that is not already required of them. They are already required to follow
federal law, but they are not required to write opinions justifying their
decisions. 46 The pending question is what sort of review a federal habeas
court ought to perform if the state court chooses not to write. If the state
court wishes to take advantage of the "unreasonable application" clause
of § 2254(d)(I), it can write; if not, then not. Some may still complain
that this is tantamount to requiring state courts to write because, it might
be said, of course all judges want their decisions reviewed as deferentially
as possible. I am unmoved by this argument. The statute establishes a
sort of quid pro quo: if state courts want their law application reviewed
deferentially, then they owe the reviewing court an explanation of what
they did.' 47 In spirit, this is entirely reminiscent of the more famous quid
pro quo in AEDPA-a fast track for death penalty cases if states step up
adequate appointment and compensation programs for
to the plate with
4
trial counsel.
There is another context in which the Supreme Court has been
untroubled by the notion of conditioning federal review on the voluntary
actions of state courts. When a state court judgment is supported by a
state law ground that is independent from any federal question and
adequate in itself to support the judgment, the Supreme Court lacks
jurisdiction to review it. 149 In the real world, however, it is often difficult
to determine whether the asserted state law ground is truly independent
of federal law.'50 Often the state court's opinion will recite that it is based
F.3 d at 335.
146. Cf. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (stating that a federal habeas court may not base
grant of relief on state court's failure to cite Supreme Court precedents).
147. Cf Steinman, supra note 57, at 1533 (asserting that the capital provisions of AEDPA show
"that there is nothing wrong with making reduced federal habeas scrutiny contingent on a
demonstration that the state's enforcement of federal rights is adequate").
148. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2266, enacted as an integral part of AEDPA, establish a regime under
which states may qualify for expedited federal habeas review of capital convictions and sentences if
they establish
a mechanism for the appointment, compensation, and payment of reasonable litigation
expenses of competent counsel in State post-conviction proceedings brought by indigent
prisoners whose capital convictions and sentences have been upheld on direct appeal to the
court of last resort in the State .... The rule of court or statute must provide standards of
competency for the appointment of such counsel.
Id at § 2261(b). This constitutes an incentive for states to provide adequate counsel for previous capital
defendants.
149. See Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (I935); Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. 59o, 636
(1874).
15o. For cases illustrating the difficulty of dealing with ambiguity in state court opinions, see for
example Delaware v. Prouse, 44o U.S. 648 (1979), and Minnesota v. National Tea Company, 309 U.S.
551, 555 (1940).
145. See Hennon, 109
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on state law as well as federal law, and yet the analysis will discuss only
federal cases. How is the Supreme Court to treat such cases? In some
instances, the Court vacated the judgment and remanded to the state
supreme court for a statement of whether the case was decided on state
or federal grounds.15"' The objection to this practice was that it placed the
burden on the state court to demonstrate the presence or absence of
federal jurisdiction. 5 In Michigan v. Long, the Court settled on a
different practice.'53 From that point on, the Court stated, it would
assume the presence of federal jurisdiction if it "fairly appeared" from
the state court's opinion that the decision was based primarily on federal
law."54
' Justice O'Connor's majority opinion explained that this left
matters in the hands of the state court. 55 If the state court wanted to
ensure that the United States Supreme Court would not review the
judgment, it needed only to state clearly in its opinion that the judgment
was based purely on a state law
ground.' The Supreme Court would
157
take the state court at its word.
The rule of Michigan v. Long is susceptible to precisely the same
objection that could be made against my proposal. The major premise of
the objection is that all courts want to avoid review of their judgments,
or, failing that, they want the most deferential review possible. The
minor premise is that conditioning the existence or level of review on the
state court's willingness to explain itself is to place a burden on the state
court. The objection then concludes that rules like that of Michigan v.
Long or my proposal in fact constitute requirements that state courts
give reasons for their decisions. There is no real choice here, the
argument runs, for a state court will feel compelled to do whatever is
necessary to ensure the most deferential review of its work.
In Michigan v. Long, the Supreme Court showed no concern for this
argument, nor should it have. The objection assumes that state courts are
somehow entitled to have their decisions immunized from federal court
review. If they were in fact entitled to such treatment, then the argument
would have considerable force. But a state supreme court has no
entitlement to avoid Supreme Court review of its decisions, and state
courts are not generally entitled to deferential review under § 2254(d).
The word "deference" is conspicuously absent from the provision. What
the provision says is that federal courts may not grant relief unless the
state court's decision is contrary to or involves an unreasonable

151. See, e.g., National Tea Company, 309 U.S. at 556-67.

152. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Jerome, 434 U.S. 241, 244 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
153. 463 U.S. 1032 (I983). For a similar argument, see Glidden, supranote 57, at 213.
154. Long, 463 U.S. at io4o-4 I .
155. Id. at 1041.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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application of federal law.1 8 Even if we assume arguendo that the
prohibition on relief in the absence of these circumstances constitutes a
"deference" of sorts, it does not apply unless the federal court can
ascertain the state court's "application of federal law" to the facts. If the
state court makes it possible for the federal court to ascertain that
analytical process, and if the analysis is objectively reasonable, then
perhaps it can be said that it becomes entitled to have its judgment stand.
But not until then.
One might object to the Michigan v. Long analogy on the ground
that the burden on a state court is less in the Michigan v. Long situation
than in the § 2254(d) situation. In the former situation, all that is required
of a state supreme court is one sentence stating, in effect, "We have
rested this decision entirely on state grounds." According to Long, this
will insulate the opinion from United States Supreme Court review.' By
contrast, under my interpretation of § 2254(d), the state court's
application of law to fact will be reviewed de novo unless the state court
writes an opinion disclosing its analytical process. But how much heavier
is this burden, really? In the majority of criminal appeals, a state
appellate court could care less what standard of review is applied to its
judgment, for the simple reason that, in the majority of criminal cases,
the defendant is obviously guilty and has no plausible claims that nonharmless federal constitutional violations were committed at trial. In
these "slam dunk" cases, the state appellate court has no real incentive to
write. Federal habeas relief will not be forthcoming whether the federal
court reviews the decision de novo or for reasonableness.
It is only in the cases where the standard of review may well make a
difference that the state court will feel impelled to write. In these cases, it
is hardly necessary for the state court to write something that could be
mistaken for an entry in the United States Reports. To begin with, the
court need write only on the claims it considers not to be "slam dunks,"
for those are the only claims as to which deferential review makes any
difference. Next, the opinion can be entirely free of roman numeral
headings, rhetorical flourishes, graceful transition sentences, and chain
citations. For each non-slam dunk claim, the court need only state the
rule it understands to be controlling and one or two sentences explaining
why that rule compels the result. The federal habeas court may think
these conclusions mistaken, but unless it finds that these explanations
"objectively unreasonable," it may not grant relief.' 6°
To recapitulate, under my interpretation of § 2254(d)(I), state
appellate courts will write opinions only in truly contestable cases, and
158. 28

U.S.C. §

2254(d)(I).

159. Long, 463 U.S. at 1o39-4o.
16o. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409 (2000).
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even then, only with respect to the truly contestable claims therein. The
opinions need merely be skeletal; they simply have to disclose enough
information for the federal court to make out the general outlines of thfe
reasoning process. In most cases, these spartan opinions would be little
more than cut-and-paste versions of bench memoranda written by clerks
or staffers to prepare the judges for oral argument. This is hardly a
burden.
Another potential objection to my interpretation is that it will add to
the burden of federal judges. Because state courts would continue not to
write opinions in many cases, under my proposal, federal habeas courts
would be obligated to conduct de novo review of those judgments. This
will add an intolerable burden to the already overworked federal district
and circuit courts, it might be argued. Federal judges should not have to
plough through the endless minutia of factbound state criminal appeals.
In such cases, they should be able to take a quick look at the merits to
see that no substantial injustice has been done, and then deny relief.
I have little doubt that this comports with the views of many
laypeople, but it obviously cannot be squared with the well-established
obligations of federal courts operating under deferential standards of
review. Even if federal habeas courts were to review for the
reasonableness of results, they would be required to roll up their sleeves
and master all the legal and factual details of the case. A federal court
reviewing a judgment according to a deferential standard is no more free
to ignore the details of a case than a criminal jury operating under the
"reasonable doubt" standard is free to ignore aspects of the prosecutor's
argument. A deferential standard of review is most certainly not license
to take shortcuts.
CONCLUSION

The time is coming when the Supreme Court will have to decide, as a
formal matter, whether § 2254(d)(I)'s "unreasonable application" clause
refers to the unreasonableness of the state court's result or the
unreasonableness of its analysis. A large share of state criminal
dispositions become final with no opinion. Another large percentage of
final judgments is accompanied by opinions that decide at least some
dispositive federal constitutional issues without explanation.' A small,
but important, percentage of state criminal judgments could be
characterized as reasonable in result but unreasonable in analysis. All of
these cases present the issue of whether it is the unreasonableness of

161. See Wilner, supra note 57, at 1454 n.65 (although the statistics are somewhat inaccessible, "the
incidence of silent opinions is probably quite high."). Wilner cites statistics from California and
Wisconsin as examples. She further theorizes that, "[s]tructural factors provide strong incentives for
state courts to issue silent opinions." Id.
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result or unreasonableness of analysis that matters, and the circuits are
split.
In Yarborough v. Alvarado, the Court has indicated that it may be
'6
headed toward adopting the unreasonableness-of-results approach. ,
One can only hope that the Court will catch itself in time. Because of its
essential illogic, the unreasonableness-of-results approach means trouble
down the line. It is simply not possible for a habeas court to determine
"how far off the mark" a state court decision of "not in custody" is from
the correct decision of "in custody."' 63 Different circuits will react
differently to this impossible demand, and the Supreme Court will end
up with the very problem it faces today. Worse yet, the
unreasonableness-of-results approach is in tension with the text and
structure of the statute. Whatever public relations shortcomings the
reasonableness-of-analysis approach might suffer, it is clearly the better
alternative.
There would be a valuable collateral benefit to choosing review for
reasonableness of analysis. The world of federal habeas corpus could use
a dose of Enlightenment values. It is easy to become cynical about
federal habeas corpus because the players are so polarized. Certainly
since the Warren Court, social conservatives have wanted to restrict
federal habeas corpus and left-liberals have reacted defensively. The
realpolitikof federal habeas corpus seems ever-present and all too clear.
It is almost as if the legal profession has lost its capacity to evaluate
doctrines and decisions by any means other than whether they will make
relief more or less available. Our thinking about habeas corpus has
become largely result-oriented, which makes it especially important that
the rules not be result-oriented.
Review for reasonableness of analysis would make an important
statement about the institution of federal habeas corpus. It would help
reassure us that reason and reasoning still matter. The preferred
dictionary definition of reason as a verb is "to think coherently and
logically; to draw inferences or conclusions from facts known or
assumed."' 6 4 The preferred dictionary definition of reason as a noun is
"an explanation or justification of an act, idea, etc."' 6 We need to be
reminded of the importance of coherent and logical thinking in habeas
adjudication. We need to be reminded of how important it is for courts to
explain and justify acts of coercion, including refusals to grant relief from
convictions.'6 I do not say that results are unimportant or irrelevant, only
162. I24 S. Ct. 214o, 2144 (2004).

163. See supra Part I.B.
164. WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE: UNABRIDGED
1502 (2d ed. 1977).
165. Id.
166. By this I do not mean that state courts must write opinions. People who have been deprived
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that the pendulum has swung too far in that direction. It is time for the
Supreme Court to make it clear that there is a place for reason in federal
habeas corpus.

of their liberty deserve an explanation from some court, whether state or federal. Under my proposal,
if the state court does not write, the federal court conducts an independent de novo review of the
federal questions. This review generally produces an opinion of some kind, even if unpublished.

318

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:283

